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Abe Fortas
William J. Brennan, Jr.t
Abe Fortas was among those rare individuals possessed of the energy
and ability to forge several distinguished careers in one lifetime. "A per-
son of great legal ability and talent," "an exceptionally gifted lawyer who
served his country with devotion in many capacities," "truly a brilliant
man," "brilliant and effective lawyer," and "an engaging man with a fine
sense of humor" were only a few of the encomiums of him expressed
when his sudden death shocked the profession.
He began his public service at age 22 in highly responsible positions
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, was general counsel of the
Public Works Administration at age 29 and Undersecretary of the Inte-
rior at age 32. He continued that meteoric rise in practice after helping
found Arnold, Fortas & Porter, one of Washington's most prestigious law
firms. But he was perhaps particularly respected for his courage in repre-
senting targets of the McCarthy Era, notably Owen Latimore-he always
had time to litigate, often without fee, important civil rights and individ-
ual rights cases of that perilous time. The appealing situation of a dis-
tressed individual enmeshed in a hard case never left him unmoved. When
he came to the Court he shared the view of many great judges that judges
spend too little time in the adopting of techniques for improving the
human race as distinguished from punishing it.
The 1970 Justices' Poll' that rated the 100 Justices who had sat on the
Court up to that time, and was conducted among leading professors of
constitutional law, American history and politics, including several law
school deans, ranked Justice Fortas among the 27 rated "great'.or "near-
great." The significance of this is that he earned that rating although in
his four short Terms as a Member of the Court he delivered only forty
opinions for the Court. Every one of the 26 other Justices given high
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ratings delivered many, many more opinions. But quality, not quantity,
was Justice Fortas' hallmark. As every reader of his opinions will whole-
heartedly agree, his opinions, lectures and numerous articles are not only
models of clarity, construction and reasoning, and the result of industrious
and comprehensive research-they also reflect a rich background of cul-
ture and learning. His passionate side interest was music-he began early
to play the violin in various string quartets, a practice he continued
throughout his life.
Justice Fortas possessed in the highest degree deep and perceptive in-
sights into the larger function of law in our turbulent and rapidly chang-
ing society. Central to his thinking was his conviction that judges must
perfect the adversary process as the essential tool for monitoring the per-
formance of other disciplines to which a complex society must look in
resolving myriad complex legal controversies. He held strongly to the view
that what the law provides is a method for seeking wisdom, not wisdom
itself.
Lively, even acrimonious, debate about the proper role of judges in a
democratic society is ever with us. The judge who believes that the judicial
power should be made creative and vigorously effective is labeled "ac-
tivist." The judge inclined to question the propriety of judicial interven-
tion to redress even the most egregious failures of democracy is labeled
"cneutralist" or "liberal"; where yesterday "activist" was pinned on "con-
servatives," today it's on "liberals." As often as not, however, such labels
are used merely to express disapproval of particular decisions. If useful at
all, the labels may be more serviceable to distinguish the judge who sees
his role as guided by the principle that "justice or righteousness is the
source, the substance and the ultimate end of the law," and the judge for
whom the principle is that "courts do not sit to administer justice, but to
administer the law." Such legendary names as Justice Holmes and Judge
Learned Hand have been associated with the latter view. Holmes' imagi-
nary Society of Jobbists is limited to judges who hold a tight rein on hu-
manitarian impulse and compassionate action, stoically doing their best to
discover and apply already existing rules. But judges acting on the former
view believe that the judicial process demands a good deal more of them
than that. Because Constitution, statute or precedent rarely speaks
unambigously, a just choice between competing alternatives has to be
made to decide concrete cases. Notre Dame's former Dean O'Meara went
to the heart of the problem in saying, ". . . the judge's role necessarily is
a creative one-he must legislate, there is no help for it . . . . When the
critical moment comes and he must say yea or nay, he is on his own; he
1050
Vol. 91: 1049, 1982
Abe Fortas
has nothing to rely on but his own intellect, experience and conscience." '
Justice Fortas was not a Jobbist-if a member of that guild must be an
automaton-like judge proceeding mechanically according to pre-deter-
mined rules. He was of that school that believes that law:
constitutes, rather a recognition of human beings, as the most dis-
tinctive and important feature of the universe which confronts our
senses, and of the function of law as the historic means of guarantee-
ing that pre-eminence to . . . jurisprudence [which in a scientific
age] . . . asks, in effect, what is the nature of man, and what is the
nature of the universe with which he is confronted . . . . Why is a
human being important; what gives him dignity; what limits his
freedom to do whatever he likes; what are his essential needs;
whence comes his sense of injustice?3
Thus, for him, a legal concept is most worthwhile when it "becomes rele-
vant to the homely experiences of individual human beings."
In short, although he knew that the act of judgment inescapably belongs
to him who bears the name of judge, he was strengthened in that arduous
task by a quiet unobtrusive faith in his fellow human beings. The work,
career and character of this scholarly, gentle, quiet-spoken and unfailingly
courteous man exemplified the judicial role at its best. He richly earned
the high respect in which he was held by all who were privileged to know
him.
2. O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 NAT'L L.F. 83, 96-97.
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